Private equity in the UK context by Morgan, Glenn
 University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Glenn Morgan 
Article Title: Private equity in the UK context 
Year of publication: 2009 
Link to published version: 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/102425890901500205 
Publisher statement: None 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private Equity in the UK context 
 
Glenn Morgan 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick, 
Coventry CV4 7AL 
UK 
 
glenn.morgan@warwick.ac.uk 
 
March 2009
 2 
Private Equity in the UK context 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Private equity has been accused of being ‘locusts’ destroying the value of companies and 
changing employee work conditions for the worse whilst extracting vast sums of the 
benefit of a small number of individuals and institutional investors. The industry defends 
itself by claiming that its particular form enables firms to overcome the agency problem 
and in this way managers can manage companies in a much more focused and effective 
way. This paper concentrates on private equity in the UK.  It argues that private equity is 
the latest of a series of ways in which finance and the City have dominated the UK 
economy. Its rapid expansion relates to changed global conditions and to the internal 
dynamics of the UK economy. In a relatively short period, large PE deals became 
significant in the UK. They led to organizational restructurings which were not very 
different from those that characterized previous periods of financial activism in terms of 
how they treated the workforce – as expendable costs. The rise of private equity led 
eventually to political opposition and although this appeared briefly to be very powerful, 
in the end it achieved little because it was never strong enough to combat the allied forces 
of the City, the Treasury and the Bank of England. In fact the only tangible outcome of 
these political debates was the minor element of reform on transparency which the 
industry itself produced. However, private equity has not been triumphant. On the 
contrary it is fully implicated in the current financial crash and its structure means that its 
growth has ceased and its very survival is in question. In some European countries, this 
may mean that rising financialisation will be halted at least temporarily. However in the 
UK where the City is powerfully entrenched, private equity may decline but it is doubtful 
whether the financial dominance of the UK economy will be fundamentally challenged.  
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Introduction 
 
In the decade leading up to the financial crisis beginning in 2007, a number of seemingly 
new actors in the financial markets took centre stage. The two most notorious and 
controversial were private equity and hedge funds. This paper focuses in particular on 
private equity. For some, private equity firms are ‘locusts’, intent on extracting value 
from existing firms and placing the bulk of that value in the hands of a small number of 
partners at the expense of the jobs, work conditions and pension rights of employees in 
the firms taken over. One UK trade union officer, for example, recently stated that 
‘employees’ pay and conditions invariably suffer’ under private equity owners (People 
Management 21/08/08 p.20). For others, private equity performs a useful function, 
enabling the restructuring and reorganization of poorly performing firms and over the 
medium term, providing more secure employment opportunities as well as delivering 
good returns to their institutional investors. . 
 
This paper aims to provide a perspective on these debates from the midst of the current 
financial crisis. The paper examines the development of private equity in the UK context. 
It is divided into the following sections. Firstly it focuses on the relationship between 
financial markets and firms in the UK economy. In the literature on ‘varieties of 
capitalism’, the UK is seen as an economy in which firms are dependent on the financial 
markets for their survival and this drives a particular form of strategy – towards the 
search for shareholder value. By placing the growth of private equity (PE) into this 
broader historical perspective, elements of continuity and change are revealed in ways 
that facilitate a clearer overall evaluation of the impact of PE in the UK over the recent 
period. Secondly, the paper provides some descriptive data on the recent development of 
PE deals in the UK. Thirdly, it examines the growth of opposition to PE in the UK 
context and the basis of this opposition. The paper looks at how far this opposition 
achieved any changes in the operation of private equity. issues and how PE itself 
responded to the criticisms raised. Finally, the paper examines how PE is developing in 
the current financial crisis. It is argued that this reveals quite clearly that whatever its 
other causes, effects and impacts, private equity is basically a creature of the recent phase 
of financialization (Erturk, Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 2008; Froud, Johal, Leaver, 
& Williams, 2006)  As this phase of financialization has effectively collapsed so we can 
expect the private equity balloon to slowly and painfully deflate; the timescale of this, 
however, is likely to be drawn out and we may expect that there will be some difficult 
crises in this exit period where new concerns may come to the fore.  
 
Finance and industry in the UK context 
 
There is a long history of debate about the interaction between finance and manufacturing 
in the UK context (Ingham, 1984). The origins of the City of London and its financial 
markets predates the industrial revolution (Kynaston, 1994). The central concern of the 
City of London has been on maintaining its role as a centre for international financial 
markets through various phases of the global economy. To sustain this position, the 
actors in the City have generally been supportive of a stable monetary regime, preferably 
associated with a strong pound, low interest rates, low government debt and low inflation. 
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In the 19th century, these conditions helped the City of London to become the centre of 
international financial markets, a process aided by the wealth of empire. Although there 
have been substantial changes in the world order since the 19th century and the City’s 
position in international financial markets has ebbed and flowed, it has broadly retained 
its attractiveness to international investors, thus feeding funds that flow through City 
institutions providing interest, commission, fees and opportunities for trade and liquidity. 
At various times, in spite of sharing a commitment to the capitalist order, this has placed 
City interests against the interests of manufacturing in crises such as those over the value 
of sterling, the size of state expenditure and the impact of these on employment.  
 
Part of the City’s attractiveness was that it basically ran its own affairs, engaging in 
various forms of private self-regulation with weak oversight on the part of the state (see, 
for example the discussion of the transformation of this system in Moran, 2003). In order 
to attract international investors, the City used this lack of regulation to innovate and 
create new products. In contrast to other countries, therefore, the UK was characterized 
by a strong financial interest, based on free, open and unregulated markets. Its banking 
system never had a strong commitment to the funding of industry; it lacked both the large 
industrial banks and the smaller publicly owned cooperative banks that characterized 
most European economies. British companies were unable to rely on long-term funding 
from banks and instead were dependent on raising capital from the financial markets. 
This made them dependent on the City even though the City’s view of the world was 
disconnected from that of manufacturing industry. On occasions, the two views came into 
conflict but over the long term, British industry shrank both in terms of size and influence 
whilst the City, although it went through periods of stagnation and decline (such as the 
1930s through to the mid 1950s) remained a powerful force in the British system. 
 
From the late 1950s, manufacturing industry found itself increasingly subject to the 
machinations of the City. This was most obvious in the market for corporate control 
which arose as firms quoted on the stock exchange found themselves subjected to 
acquisition and takeover bids. Over the period from the late 1950s through to the 2000s, 
the market for corporate control involving UK firms quoted on the London stock markets 
has outstripped anywhere else other than the US. The market for corporate control and 
this development reflects a number of key interests within the City context (for some of 
the most astute analyses of these changes see the books by former practitioners Augar, 
2000, 2006; Golding, 2001). Firstly, this market is fee-based and these fees are high 
value. It is therefore highly profitable for a banking institution to be involved in M+A 
activity because of the fees involved for advice but also the whole raft of associated fees 
which can be gained, e.g. associated with underwriting loans. Secondly, this market 
reflects the influence of shareholders, the ultimate deciders of the outcome of M+A 
activity. Shareholders generally gain an immediate boost for their earnings in M+A 
situations since the shares of the acquired firm are generally priced generously by the 
potential acquirer. Thirdly this market reflects the growing aspirations of managers to run 
large companies and gain commensurately in terms of their own rewards. The least 
influential actors in this process are the employees of the firms involved in the M+A. 
Until recently they have limited employment rights or rights to information and 
communication. Another aspect of this is that such processes have increasingly disrupted 
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any long-term investments in new products by leading both to frequent organizational 
restructuring and to frequent changes in personnel, teams and locations (Froud et al., 
2006). 
 
It is for these reasons, therefore, that the UK has been labeled as a liberal market 
economy – one in which firms are dependent on financial markets for their survival, 
forcing them in to a relatively short-term orientation to investment coupled with an active 
process of relating to financial markets and their shareholders (Soskice & Hall, 2001) – a 
process which leads to frequent organizational restructuring and instabilities. How this 
relationship is actually managed, however, depends on specific circumstances in terms 
both of the internal dynamics of the UK and of the global economy (see, for example, the 
analysis of how the UK changed under Thatcherism and the impact on its form of 
capitalism in Schmidt, 2002). More particularly, the dominance of finance increased in 
the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. Clearly this was partly a matter of the political 
dominance of Thatcherism with its emphasis on deregulating financial markets, 
privatization, encouraging individual share ownership, personal pensions, and home 
ownership. Associated with this was a growing focus on shareholder value and delivering 
value to shareholders as an increasingly dominant force (Froud et al., 2006). This reduced 
management’s ability to cross-subsidise in order to provide time for businesses to grow. 
It made it practically impossible to build up stores of capital within the firm as such 
capital became attractive to potential predators. It made it difficult for firms to invest in 
long term innovation processes. Shareholder value was built on the idea of short term 
profit maximization and distributing this back to shareholders in the form of dividends or 
increasing the value of stocks through, for example, buy-back schemes. Although unions 
fought against this and critics argued that this was leading to the deindustrialization of 
Britain, the City grew in power, wealth and influence.  
 
This growth was not uninterrupted. The global economy continued to have booms and 
slumps and by the second half of the 1990s, there were increasing crises in parts of the 
financial system (such as in the Asian financial crisis). The dot-com boom and crash 
followed soon after by the ENRON collapse led to demands for more regulation, 
particularly in the US where the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced new measures on 
corporate governance, a trend which was followed in a minor way in the UK. For those 
who continued to support market mechanisms, these changes fuelled the skepticism of 
some authors which had been brewing since the 1980s about the effectiveness of public 
corporations. By the late 1980s, Jensen, a Harvard financial economist, was discussing 
‘the eclipse of the public corporation’ (Jensen, 1989). In this view, public corporations 
were becoming subject to too much regulation and to many conflicting and competing 
demands through shareholders, media discussion and public debate. One possible 
solution was to take the corporation out of the public arena and make it a private 
company. If it was private, then in theory, decisions could be reached more quickly and 
implemented more effectively. Thus funds that had previously been steered towards 
supporting merger and acquisition activity on the public markets began instead to flow 
into private equity. In this respect, private equity was the latest adaptation of the City to 
the politics and economics of extracting capital through financial means. Whilst private 
equity was not new in its form, it was new in terms of the scale of its significance for the 
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broader economy in the period 2002-2007. Many of its impacts were similar to the 
impacts of the M+A booms that had occurred in the UK in the mid 1980s and late 1990s 
but because of the specific form of PE and the specific political and economic context of 
this period, the result has been a new twist in the relationship between finance and 
industry in the UK context. 
 
The nature and growth of Private Equity in the UK context 
 
Between 1995 and 2007, 15652 firms received private equity fund funding according to 
the BVCA ((BVCA, 2007b; 58). Over the period 2001-2007, roughly the same number of 
UK companies (around 1300) received PE funding each year. However these figures 
conceal the increasing importance of a small number of mega-deals and associated with 
this a significant increase in the amount of capital employed in the deals. In its analysis of 
annual trends, the Centre for Management Buyout Research at Nottingham University 
has shown that although the number of buyout deals in the UK has remained fairly 
constant, the total amount of capital invested has increased massively from less than £10 
billion in 1995 up to a peak of £45.9 billion in 2007 
(www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/cmbor). A similar pattern appears in European private 
equity in that the number of deals hovers between 1200 and 1500 between 1997 and 2007 
but the amount of funds invested increases over four fold in this period with the largest 
leap occurring between 2003 and 2007 (Jenkinson, 2008). What these figures indicate is a 
significant change in the nature of private equity investment in the period 2003/4- 2007. 
This is reflected also in the figures published in the UK House of Commons report on 
private equity which show that large buy-out (and buy-in) deals (i.e. over £50m) 
increased in numbers from 67 in 2000 to 90 in 2006 and most of this increase arose from 
deals in the largest category (over £250m) occurred in the period from 2004 onwards 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee 2007). By 2007, deals involving 67 (out of the 
total 1330 companies which received PE that year) accounted for 5% of the total number 
of deals but 76% of the total funds invested. Of these mega deals, in 2007 28 private 
equity owned firms met the following three size criteria (which were established by the 
Walker Committee); their enterprise value was greater than £500m, their UK 
employment was more than 1000 full time equivalents and more than 50% of their 
revenue was generated in the UK.  
 
The Treasury Committee estimated that by 2007, 8% of the UK’s workforce (1.2 million 
workers) was employed in private equity owned firms and 19% either work in or used to 
work in private equity owned firms. In terms of sectors, in 2007, firms in consumer 
services (food and drug retailers, general retailers, media and travel and leisure) 
constituted 21% of all PE investments and 51% of total amount invested (BVCA 2007: 
15-16). Industrials also constituted 21 % of the number of investments though their value 
was only 17%. Private equity owned firms constitute a significant part of the UK 
economy.  Their names constitute some of the most well-known brands on the British 
High Street, e.g. Alliance Boots, National Car Parks, New Look (clothes retailer), Odeon 
and ICI Cinemas, Phones4U, Somerfield, Travelodge, Weetabix, the AA. 
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The growth of private equity in the UK reflected both the changed global context and the 
specific conditions of the UK. In relation to the global context, the period from the mid 
90s up to 2007 was characterized by high levels of investment capital seeking outlets in 
alternative asset classes from company stock and shares and government bonds in a 
context where interest rates and inflation were relatively low. This capital was available 
firstly because of a global imbalance of trade which left resource rich countries and China 
in particular holding dollars that required to be invested; secondly because of high 
savings rates in certain countries associated with a combination of demographic forces 
and particular forms of pension arrangements; thirdly because the development of 
securitization processes and markets enabled banks to move lending off their balance 
sheets almost as quickly as they did the actual lending and in this way to lend again; 
fourthly because the army of intermediaries in the financial markets earnt fees on the 
number and scale of transactions and were therefore active in creating markets for these 
securitized bonds. As is now clear, this created an environment of high liquidity where 
loans were easy to get hold of because lenders were able to quickly pass on the risk of the 
loan through the financial markets. Private equity depended on these easy lending 
conditions and high levels of liquidity because it depended on double form of leverage; 
on the basis of a relatively small initial financial commitment of the partners in the 
private equity company, it could gain access to massive funds in this market context. 
Thus it was relatively easy for much of this period for private equity to raise the other 
70% of capital needed to supplement their own existing funds and enable them to 
purchase companies.  
 
In terms of specific UK conditions, the City of London contained large numbers of 
international banks and investors which sought to participate in this process. The banks 
were able to organize the loans necessary for the high levels of leverage required by 
private equity. International investors were used to working in the City; they were keen to 
find new asset classes which could bring higher returns than normal stock market 
investment which was increasingly becoming pre-programmed and index linked. The 
political, regulatory, employment and tax environment was favourable to the private 
equity model.  Private equity firms had been established in the UK for some years before 
this boom and had well-established track records, organizational infrastructures and 
managerial competences. The UK also had well-established financial markets that 
enabled viable exit options for private equity investments though, for example, initial 
public offerings. Alternative exits were also feasible in the UK, e.g. because of the high 
concentration of private equity funds, the possibility of selling an investment from one 
PE firm to another was always possible. Similarly the mechanisms for making trade 
sales, i.e. selling off a PE investment to another company was also easy to accomplish 
given the range of linkages which the PE firm and its banking advisers would be likely to 
have in the broader market.  In contrast to most Continental European countries, 
therefore, this was a favourable environment for private equity firms themselves to set up 
and expand as well as to engage in acquisitions and sell-offs. 
 
The legitimation for private equity was also well accepted in the UK context. The 
argument that public companies faced agency problems that could be overcome by 
creating a board structure that was smaller, more focused and more directly incentivized 
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to increase the value of the firm reflected a broader discourse in which incentives through 
share options and the performance of shares was an unproblematic part of the self-
understanding of the UK financial sector (up to 2008).  In terms of the agency debate, 
private equity ownership did lead to a substantial reorganization of corporate boards (De 
Cock, Gospel, Jackson, Kirkbride, McNulty, & Morgan, 2007). The boards of acquired 
companies were much smaller than they had been as public companies. Depending on the 
size of the acquired company, the private equity firm would put between one and three of 
its own partners onto the new board as directors. These directors would oversee the PE 
investment and bring a certain level of expertise, knowledge and networks to the working 
of the new firm. The rest of the board would also be carefully selected by the PE firm. 
The Executive Chair and the Finance Director were particularly important appointments. 
Most PE firms have a pool of senior managers with whom they have worked a number of 
times. These managers move into a PE acquisition, manage the changes in order to create 
value and then oversee the exit strategy. They stay for around 2-4 years before moving on 
and performing the same role in another company. Some of the largest PE firms 
explicitly recognize this pool and bring them together on an occasional basis to discuss 
common problems or provide a means of seeking their advice and communicating with 
them on broader issues besides the fate of the company which they are managing. These 
senior managers are expected to invest a substantial part of their own personal wealth into 
the acquired firm and can expect to benefit if the exit strategy is managed successfully. 
Similarly, where managers from the acquired firm are invited to stay on under private 
equity ownership, they are also expected to provide capital towards the new company. 
 
It was also undoubtedly the case that some PE funds were able to produce high returns in 
this period between 2003-2007 as they purchased companies at what subsequently 
appeared to be relatively low prices, rapidly restructured them (often releasing capital 
through selling off and leasing bank land as well as reducing employment costs) and were 
able to sell them back into the rising bull market of the period within a time frame of two 
to four years at the maximum. In the context of UK capitalism, where firm restructurings 
driven by the financial markets had been common for many years, the private equity 
boom was broadly seen as a new and effective variation on finance driven change 
processes. It was supported by the City institutions, the regulators, the institutional 
investors and the government (and the Conservative opposition) as a positive gain for the 
UK economy. 
 
The growth of opposition to private equity in the UK 
 
As private equity grew in importance in the UK, so too did opposition and concern about 
its effects. The arguments have increasingly focused around the impact of PE on jobs and 
working conditions and the ‘unfair’ tax advantages of PE together with the size of 
bonuses and earnings for PE partners. 
 
Private equity and jobs 
 
In terms of jobs, trade unions argued that in many cases where the immediate impact of 
private equity was to scrap existing employment conditions, cut the workforce, intensify 
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work conditions and reduce benefits. In the early stages, private equity tends to be very 
focused on cost reduction in order to ensure that it can meet its debt repayment 
obligations. As authors such as Clark emphasize (Clark, 2007; 2008; see also; Thornton, 
2007), private equity management takes advantage of the fact that its purchases do not 
come under TUPE regulations (because they are considered to be changes of ownership 
rather than a transfer of activities from one company to another) and often aims to change 
the conditions of employment in order to intensify work and reduce the influence of trade 
unions. Private equity also seeks to reduce expenditure on company pension schemes 
either by switching employees out of such schemes into cheaper, individual alternatives 
or by failing to fill financial holes that emerge in pension schemes or by transferring 
pension fund management and obligations to insurers. Other authors point to case study 
research which reveals the extent to which employment costs are squeezed by private 
equity management (Froud & Williams, 2007).  
 
These arguments are relatively difficult to substantiate because of the problems 
associated with getting comparable data over time (Watt, 2008). The most systematic 
research on this topic has been undertaken by researchers such as Wright and Bacon at 
CMBOR using a database stretching back to the 1980s. The fairly consistent finding of 
these studies is that whilst employment numbers drop in the first year of the acquisition, 
after this they tend to climb slowly if steadily as the company is restructured (Bacon & 
Wright, 2008). They also suggest that overall there is an increase in what have been 
described as high commitment HR strategies e.g. more performance related pay schemes, 
increased team work and functional flexibility, increased training and more job security 
(Bacon, Wright, Demina, Bruining, & Boselie, 2008). Bacon and Wright, for example, 
state that ‘employees in buy-outs have more discretion over how they tackle their work 
than comparable workers at other firms…Overall union recognition rates remain 
unaffected by private equity investors’ ((Bacon & Wright, 2008). They argue that these 
trends are particularly noticeable in cases of what they describe as ‘insider’ buyouts, i.e. 
where the existing management of a firm is retained to run the new private equity owned 
business. Interestingly, Bacon et al. (2008) show that where employment rights are strong 
such as in the Netherlands, private equity has to adapt to this, whereas in countries like 
the UK where these are weaker, private equity is freer to get rid of employees or change 
job conditions in significant ways. 
 
Private equity earnings 
 
The standard model for PE earnings is based on a 2% fee per annum based on funds 
invested and a 20% return on the extra value created in a sold off company (subject to the 
achievement of an acceptable ‘hurdle rate’, usually around 8%). Achieving this return 
requires a degree of financial innovation and ingenuity at all stages of the process. This 
begins with keeping the price paid for the company as low as possible. Where the PE 
partners intend to keep on some of the senior managers of the acquired company, this 
creates potential conflicts of interest since these senior managers are employed to 
maximize the price of the company to be sold whilst from a personal point of view, the 
lower the price the higher their ultimate gain when the firm is sold on by the PE acquirer. 
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Once the firm is acquired at the high leverage levels discussed, the PE owners look to 
reduce the debt by selling off some non-core assets. One crucial set of assets which has 
been defined as non-core has been land and property. Given the boom in commercial 
property prices in this period, PE firms were able to release large amounts of capital by 
selling off this asset and leasing it back. This is one explanation as to why consumer 
services have played such an important role in PE expansion; they generally come with 
large amounts of retail property that can be subject to this sale and leaseback operation. 
When the large UK supermarket chain, Sainsburys, became a target for PE acquisition, 
the value of its property portfolio was seen as a key asset that could be subjected to sale 
and leaseback, thus quickly reducing the amount borrowed. Most large publicly quoted 
retailers prefer to retain the control and security that owning their own property gives 
them; for PE, however, access to the cash is more important. Other financial engineering 
techniques may be used e.g. renegotiating the debt in order to reduce payments or in 
order to pay a special dividend to the owners. PE needs a steady stream of revenue in 
order to service its debt. This is one of the reasons why PE investments tend to go into 
steady and unspectacular companies, where there is a reliable base of income generating 
activities. Investing in research and development is unlikely both because it would 
require diverting funds away from debt servicing and because the industries in which PE 
is invested are generally not noted for their innovation. The goal of these activities and 
other efforts to reduce costs and increase revenue is to pay off debt at the most financially 
opportune moment so that when the exit strategy is fixed, as much of the value of the 
company as possible is now vested in the shareholders and debts to others have been 
reduced. Thus potentially large sums are returned to the investors. 
 
In the case of the private equity partners, 20% of the value of a company returned to 
public markets can create a large pool of money to be distributed amongst a very small 
number of people creating huge personal fortunes for leading partners. Thornton, for 
example, states that ‘in the case of successful mid-market funds, six to 10 partners could 
expect a carry of £5m to £15m after 5 years; for partners in the much smaller number of 
very large funds, the rewards might be of the order of £50m to £150m’ (Thornton, 2007 
21 ). In the UK, that money has been covered under rules concerning capital gains and 
investment in business which means that in effect, where the investment has been in 
existence for more than 2 years, it has been taxed at only 10%, far below the level of 
income tax. Because it is possible in the UK to claim domicile overseas even when 
working predominantly in the UK, these inequalities of tax take can be extended further. 
The Observer newspaper claimed for example that only 40 of the top 200 private equity 
partners were tax domiciled in the UK (17 June 2007). Even within the industry, there 
was concern about the inequalities that were created. In 2007, Nicholas Ferguson, 
chairman of the private equity firm CVG Capital, said: "Any commonsense person would 
say that a highly-paid private equity executive paying less tax than a cleaning lady or 
other low-paid workers...can't be right" (Times 5 June 2007). Trade unions have been 
vociferous in their campaign for reform of the taxation system and the increasing 
inequalities in societies represented by the high earnings of private equity partners. 
 
The politics of private equity 
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By mid 2007, the concern over private equity in the UK had increased to such an extent 
that the issue became a political flashpoint. The PE industry itself had recognized that 
some such storm was coming and its industry body (the BVCA) had sought to circumvent 
this in February 2007 by setting up ‘a review of the adequacy and transparency in private 
equity with a view to recommending a set of guidelines for conformity by the industry on 
a voluntary basis’. Sir David Walker, a former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England 
as well as Chairman of the Securities and Investment Board (the precursor to the 
Financial Services Authority), was asked to produce the report working with an advisory 
group of industry insiders. A consultation document known as the Walker Report 
(BVCA, 2007a) was published in July 2007 and following further inputs the key 
recommendations were implemented in 2008. 
 
Unfortunately this response from the industry (details of which are discussed later) came 
too late to prevent the public humiliation to which the leaders of private equity were 
subjected at the hands of the Treasury Committee in June 2007. The Treasury Committee 
of MPs took evidence in public from a number of academics, public figures, trade unions 
and others in which a range of criticisms of private equity were made. Montgomerie et al. 
studied this process in detail; they state that; 
“It is unanimously agreed that private equity industry, the BVCA, and the large-cap funds 
gave a feeble performance in their oral evidence to the Treasury Select Committee. Poor 
public engagement fuelled the ongoing media frenzy over the excess of the private equity 
industry. Combative and ineffectual testimony in front of the committee by the BVCA 
and General Partners of large-caps led to open animosity in the public hearing” 
(Montgomerie, Leaver, & Nilsson, 2008; 12)   
In the immediate aftermath of the BVCA appearing before the MPs, its executive 
director, Peter Linthwaite, resigned such was the public criticism of the organization and 
its evidence. In preparation for their appearance before the Committee the following 
week, leaders of some of the largest private equity firms in the UK hired public relations 
experts to try to improve their presentation.  Montgomerie et al. argue that private equity 
did so poorly because it refused to acknowledge that there might be any problems at all 
with the PE model; 
“Essentially the industry body tried to claim that private equity could be all things to 
workers, investors and the firms they acquire…Perhaps it is no surprise that such 
fantastic claims were greeted with intense skepticism….Efforts to put forward the 
multiple benefits of private equity and the universal gains realized by their business 
activities were ultimately unconvincing because of the lack of corroborating 
evidence…Alongside the weakness in the evidence the industry suffered from its 
inability to provide a cohesive and plausible account of business practices” 
(Montgomerie et al., 2008; 13-14). 
  
However, although there was general consensus about this in the media, the Treasury 
Select Committee report when it was published was, as might be expected from a 
bipartisan committee, much more muted in its criticisms and suggestions (House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2007). On employment issues, it called for more 
information and consultation by PE owned companies and asked for ACAS to be 
involved in facilitating this. It also, strangely, sought for clarification from the 
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government about the application of TUPE regulations to PE even though most 
participants were convinced that TUPE did not apply.  On transparency, the Committee 
agreed to await the Walker Report recommendations to see if the industry could put its 
own house in order. On taxation, the Committee was critical and called for more action 
from the government and the tax authorities to avoid abuse of the system.  Not 
surprisingly, Montgomerie et al describe this in terms of PE ‘losing the battles but 
winning the war’. In the buoyant financial context which existed up to mid 2007 and 
continued to survive into 2008 even as the financial crisis gathered pace, there was very 
little government will to take up the issues raised in the Committee discussions, 
particularly once the Committee itself had been so reticent in terms of suggestions for 
new regulation. 
 
As a result, the only significant change from these political debates arose from the 
industry reforming itself and implementing the Walker report. The recommendations 
from the Report concentrated on the issue of transparency to the exclusion of almost 
everything else. It had nothing to say about working conditions, trade union rights or 
taxation issues. Instead it concentrated on public concern that a number of large 
companies were being taken off the public markets where they were obliged to make 
statements about their accounts, their strategy, their management and governance and 
placed into the private sector which required none of this. Similarly it was concerned to 
counter criticism that PE partnerships which now controlled substantial parts of the UK 
economy did not have to disclose much information about themselves and their activities 
since they were private partnership. Walker therefore recommended that the largest PE 
owned companies and the largest PE partnerships be subjected to some sort of disclosure 
and transparency regime. 
 
With regard to the PE owned companies, the bar was set very high. Only the very largest 
companies (over £500m in acquisition price) AND over 1000 employees in the UK AND 
over 50% revenue generated in the UK were to be subject to this disclosure regime. In the 
first report following the acceptance of these proposals (Ernst and Young, 2009), this net 
caught only 28 companies (out of the approximately 26,000 firms in which PE has 
invested since 1987 according to the BVCA’s own figures). These firms were asked to 
provide audited accounts, to identify their PE owners, share their risk management 
objectives and provide a business review. The Guidelines Monitoring Group which 
published its first report in January 2009 was broadly content with the response of the PE 
owned firms though it noted a number of areas where some firms could perform better, 
e.g. some companies did not provide full information on their board of directors and 
detailed quantifiable evidence on employees was limited (Guidelines Monitoring Group, 
2009). The PE partnerships required to make enhanced disclosure were those owning 
companies meeting the criteria for disclosure. This meant that 32 PE firms were required 
to disclose and whilst again the Guidelines Monitoring Group was generally satisfied, it 
was nevertheless the case that only ‘half of the private equity firms initially met all their 
disclosure requirements’ (p.12).  
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that in spite of huge negative publicity in the period up to 
and including the Treasury Select Committee hearings, the private equity industry has 
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barely responded to these concerns. It has implemented some relatively minor voluntary 
disclosure guidelines which have caused it little difficulty. The great bulk of PE owned 
firms or PE partnerships are totally unaffected by this and there is little indication of what 
impact, if any, this might have on the companies and the employees concerned. 
Ultimately opposition to private equity was not sufficiently organized, coherent or 
powerful to force change on what was a very powerful interest group within the City 
supported by the UK government as part of the effort to maintain London as a global 
financial centre. Whether the outcome would have been any different if the financial 
crisis had not intervened and forced everybody’s attention to key questions of system 
stability and economic viability is difficult to determine.  
 
The Financial Crisis and Private equity in the UK  
 
In the period 2003-2007, private equity was able to achieve rapid gains by a financial 
reengineering of the company. High levels of liquidity and confidence in the gains to be 
made from private equity investment and in financial dealings enabled this engineering to 
become ever more sophisticated. It also speeded up the circulation of capital and different 
forms of financial instruments in the market leading to a speculative boom in asset prices. 
This in turn fed back into the valuation of the private equity companies and enabled 
further financial reengineering. Much of the gains in this period reflected simply the 
conditions of the boom economy. As shares moved up, more capital (some of it borrowed 
and leveraged) flowed into the market seeking to capture some of these gains; this in turn 
pushed the market higher. In these conditions simply holding on to an asset for a time had 
a high chance of generating a gain for the owner. It was a classic speculative boom that 
pushed all prices upwards so long as there was confidence that the spiral would continue. 
Therefore private equity could achieve big gains in the same way other investors were 
gaining before it had to do anything more complicated to generate value. Within a 
relatively short period of time assets could be sold via the various exit options and high 
returns generated, particularly for the private equity partners. 
 
Whatever the gains made through new forms of management and governance, the success 
of private equity was very much based on its ability to engage in financial management 
under conditions of high liquidity, low interest rates and rising stock markets. This is 
revealed very clearly when we consider how private equity has developed since the credit 
crunch. It is important to note that private equity still retains capital to invest though this 
is shrinking. When funds were set up in 2006 and 2007, the basis of the investment was 
that it would be available for ten years. Private equity could use these funds to rescue and 
restructure businesses being brought under pressure by the credit crunch. However, 
private equity now finds it practically impossible to find buyers for its debt and therefore 
it cannot exercise leverage and cannot generate deals. Because it cannot exercise leverage 
it lacks the possibility of doing the big deals and generating the management fees and 
‘carry’ income that it was able to in the previous period. On 19 December 2008, the 
Financial Times reported that ‘private equity groups invested less that £1bn in the UK 
market during the past three months, the lowest quarterly figure since 1995…The total 
value of buy-outs in the UK for the year stands at £19.1bn, compared with a record 
£45.9bn in 2007…Cash-strapped banks are refusing to lend money for almost any 
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leveraged buy-out except to acquire secure companies in the most defensive sectors. 
Even when debt is available from banks, it is often expensive.”  Furthermore, these cash 
strapped investors are beginning to seek ways to pull their funds out of private equity. On 
18 December 2008, the Guardian reported that SVG capital which accounts for almost a 
third of the private equity company Permira’s main fund had cut its commitment by 40% 
in order to repair its own balance sheet. 
 
The other side of this is that private equity has far fewer options in terms of exiting the 
businesses which it bought over the last few years. Stock market prices are still falling. 
There are few firms willing to engage in a trade sale and secondary sales to other private 
equity firms are stagnant. In effect, therefore, private equity will find it difficult to release 
funds from existing investments and may have to hold on to them for much longer than 
was originally expected. It can also be expected that the number of failures will increase 
amongst the firms purchased by private equity. The IUF’s Private Equity Buyout Watch 
reported on 4 December 2008 that up ‘up to half of the companies taken private in the 
past three years face potentially serious problems with continuing to finance their debt’ 
because of the general downturn in business. The result may be a series of negotiations 
with lenders including turning debt into equity in order to reduce the burden on fixed 
repayments. If this happens (and banks are generally resistant to such deals), the result 
will be to diminish substantially the possible gains to be made by the private equity firm 
and its investors. In this context, private equity groups with funds to spend appear to be 
starting to act more like traditional institutional investors in that they are now reported to 
be buying stocks of public companies though it is unclear how this can justify the fee 
structure of private equity (the 2/20 model) as opposed to the traditional institutional 
investment model. Meanwhile they are left in the traditional position of owners of 
companies during periods of recession; they have to cut costs and sweat assets in a 
context where markets are weakening. Unwinding these existing assets may prove painful 
burdened as they are by substantial debt.  
 
These difficulties reflect the fear expressed in a number of sources including regulators 
and the Treasury Select Committee that the big underlying problem with private equity 
was the risk factor and the possibility of systemic contagion. The models by which PE 
worked were based on low interest rates, high liquidity and rising asset prices. This made 
the 30/70 (shares/debt) leverage structure possible but it meant that if interest rates rose, 
if liquidity froze and asset prices started to fall, companies would become more 
vulnerable to failure than if their structure were the other way round (70/30) as tended to 
be the case in publicly quoted companies. The result is that PEs are locked in to 
investments for much longer than they expected and it is not clear that these investments 
will realize the value necessary to pay off the loans, never mind, pay the level of bonuses 
and rewards which PE received just a few years ago. In these conditions, institutional 
investors, themselves in difficult positions because of other asset price falls and holes in 
the balance sheets of their owning financial institutions may look to pull out their money 
as soon as possible, leading to a spiral downwards. The fact that so many PE funds and 
PE companies are based in the UK therefore contributes to the speedy decline of the UK 
economy under the impact of the financial crisis.  
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From this perspective, UK capitalism is undergoing one of its periodic processes of 
adjustment though on a far larger and more intense scale than anything that has happened 
since the early 20th century. Private equity just like the investment banking community 
more generally is having to work through the consequences of the financial crisis. It is 
unlikely that the conditions which facilitated its rapid growth up to 2007 are going to 
return in the near future. This will not stop UK capitalism restructuring but will rather 
mean that it will do so under new conditions and possibly with new financial actors 
playing a significant role. One such set of actors may be the banks which have been taken 
into partial public ownership. It may be that the government will try to use these 
institutions to establish new relationships between finance and industry. However, this 
would be to sideline the traditionally powerful forces of the City of London and financial 
markets and whilst they are currently cowed by the severity of the crisis and the scale of 
public disapprobation, these forces tend to find ways to resurrect themselves and their 
powers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
UK capitalism has long been based on the dominant position of finance. Over the last 40 
years, finance has driven rounds of organizational restructuring in British industry. These 
cycles of restructuring have predominantly occurred around merger and acquisition in the 
stock market. In these processes of restructuring, labour has been treated as a variable 
cost and managers have often sought to reduce the costs associated with labour by 
changing the conditions of work or reducing numbers employed. Unlike employees in 
other parts of Europe, British workers have had little support from the state in resisting 
these processes of change. As, therefore, trade union organization has declined in 
efficacy and impact, the power of managers urged on by shareholders to maximize 
shareholder value has increased. There has been no golden age when British employees 
were consulted and informed, had their jobs protected by labour market regulations and 
their skills enhanced by employers keen to invest in human capital.  
 
From this perspective, the rise of private equity illustrates a change in the circumstances 
of financial capital as the perceived cost of the public corporation (in terms of agency 
costs, monitoring costs, regulatory and compliance costs) increased. Alongside this the 
ability to raise large funds enabling firms to be taken private and reorganized outside of 
the glare of competing interests and media publicity became increasingly attractive. 
There is no reason to believe that this change made much impact on how employees were 
managed. This continued much as before with some examples of high commitment work 
organization but many other examples of low skilled workers being squeezed to do more 
for less. The impetus for the change was primarily financial and as such it was supported 
by the well developed alliance of City institutions, the Treasury and the Bank of England. 
In a few short years, this model extended rapidly through the UK economy.  
 
Gradually opposition to this grew on a range of grounds – from the treatment of 
employees through to the issues of taxation and systemic instability. For a brief period in 
2007, this opposition appeared to be winning the public battle, a process which 
culminated in the grilling received by the industry association, the BVCA, and some of 
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the top industry managers, by the House of Common Treasury Committee. However, this 
proved to be a false dawn as the Committee failed to produce any substantive proposals 
for change. The only change which came about was in terms of some minor increases in 
transparency, a change which was in fact engineered by the industry.  
 
However if private equity lost the public battles but won the war, it was a pyrrhic victory 
as the crash of the financial system in 2008-2009 has completely changed the 
circumstances for the industry. The loss of liquidity, the flight to safety of investors, the 
collapse of the IPO and other markets for PE owned companies not only threatens to 
reduce the earnings from these investments but to actually cause the bankruptcy of these 
companies. It is not clear how long PE owned companies can continue to survive and pay 
the interest on their leveraged loans even where existing covenants have been 
renegotiated. The PE firms themselves are in precarious positions financially and many 
may yet go out of business as has happened to hedge funds. In many European countries, 
this will probably be the death-knell of private equity. In the UK, one would need to be 
slightly more cautious as whatever the route out of the current crisis and however 
strongly involved the state becomes in this, it is clear that the City will not easily give up 
its dominance within the UK context. Private equity may not return in the same way but 
other forms of financial engineering aimed at extracting value from the UK economy will 
no doubt arise again.  
  
As soon as financial conditions changed and speculation, debt and leverage were exposed 
as high risk, private equity was left high and dry. It cannot borrow in the way it used to; 
nor can it exit its current investments. It is in effect left with the job of managing them 
profitably as far as it can in the hope that eventually market conditions will return that 
will allow it to exit and restructure its own assets. In the meantime this will be a testing 
time for the management abilities of private equity. Given previous experience, there is 
little reason to believe that they will adapt any better to the changed market conditions 
than any other form of corporate structure. 
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